

CHAPTER FIVE

Nonstate Actors as Forces of Globalization

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NONSTATE ACTORS have been playing increasingly important roles in international relations. In discussing the growth of civil societies throughout the world, we may wish to pay particular attention to the ways in which these societies interact across national boundaries, thus constituting a vital aspect of the phenomenon of globalization. While it is customary to discuss the phenomenon as a post-cold war development, in fact cross-national exchanges among nonstate actors have been going on for quite some time; indeed, there are writers who contend that interactions among nonstate actors were characteristic of the prestate (i.e., premodern) period of history. Even if we confine ourselves to the history of the 20th century, when state power has tended to extend itself to cover more and more aspects of human life, we can see a trend to preserve the autonomy of individuals, private groups, and various organizations and communities, both within the territorial state and across national boundaries.

Although nonstate actors and civil societies engage in a myriad of activities, this chapter will focus on one of them, intellectual exchange, and discuss how the promotion of intellectual exchange programs among nations has fostered, and been in turn fostered by, the growth of nonstate organizations, together contributing to the emerging process of globalization. The integrative forces drawing national societies into a global community have of late converged with domestic forces in Japan (many of which are discussed in the other chapters of this volume) to

ignite momentous change in the country's private sector. It is hoped that a historical view of the development of nonstate actors through intellectual exchange will provide clues to how Japan's civil society can respond to the challenges of globalization.

EARLY INTERNATIONALIST CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

Intellectual exchange is part of the broad phenomenon known as cultural exchange: interactions at the cultural level among individuals and groups across national boundaries. In a book entitled *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Iriye 1997), I argued that the movement for promoting cross-national understanding through the sharing of information, the holding of world fairs and international conferences, and, quite simply, the coming together of scholars, students, artists, journalists, tourists, and many others was a notable aspect of international relations at the turn of the 20th century—the very moment when the “great powers” were amassing arms and colonies to turn themselves into even greater powers. Their (presumably) constant struggle for power was taken for granted by strategists, politicians, and publicists alike. Conflict, as Alfred Thayer Mahan, the U.S. naval strategist who exemplified this type of thinking, asserted, was and would continue to remain the basic law of national and international affairs. Such being the case, all states, and all people whose identity was primarily defined by them, had to struggle to be strong—stronger than their neighbors and the neighbors of their neighbors; otherwise, they were destined to “decline,” since all nations either “rose or fell.”

Against this sort of geopolitical determinism, thinkers, mostly in Europe and North America, began a movement, which they called “internationalism,” to overcome such fatalism and to organize the world differently, to internationalize it so that people everywhere would develop a sense of shared destiny. Even those who did not articulate such a vision self-consciously—businesspeople, travelers, even characters in fiction—became part of the movement by meeting with their counterparts in other countries, thereby developing connections, friendships, and networks that did not coincide with the territorial definition of loyalty and human association. At that time, intellectual exchange was particularly conspicuous because intellectuals—scholars, artists, journalists—were in a better position to try to practice what they preached; they not only talked about international understanding but sought to

promote it by organizing international professional associations and holding conferences that brought their members together every few years.

Already by the first decade of the century there had been organized scores of such organizations, including, for instance, the International Union of Ethical Societies, the International Musical Society, and the International Society of Intellectuals. These organizations held their meetings periodically; examples would include the International Art Congress, the International Congress of Historians, and the International Congress of Geographical Sciences. Some of the international conferences were of really grand scale, the World Congress of Arts and Science held in St. Louis in 1904 being a conspicuous example. Scores of distinguished scholars of the natural sciences, philosophy, politics, economics, history, linguistics, literature, art history, religion, medicine, and other fields came to discuss recent achievements and future prospects. These organizations and conferences dedicated themselves to the proposition that intellectual and cultural endeavors must be promoted internationally and that their internationalization would be conducive to friendship and understanding among nations. It must be admitted, though, that at this time the vast majority of participants came from Europe and North America.

These were notable beginnings, indicating not only the emergence of an internationalist cultural movement but also the development of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). According to Johan Galtung (1975), in 1910 there were already 135 internationally oriented nongovernmental organizations. F. L. S. Lyons (1963) notes that 466 international NGOs were established between 1815 and 1914. Whichever figure we choose, it is noteworthy that the vast majority of these organizations were created toward the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th, and that a significant portion of them were concerned with the promotion of intellectual exchange broadly defined. It is not too much to say that both nongovernmental organizations and intellectual exchange activities had their initial and promising start in the years preceding the Great War.

That the Great War came despite such activities suggests, of course, that a handful of organizations of intellectuals was powerless against the far more formidable tides of nationalism and militarism that were enveloping the world. As is well known, most, if not all, of the European internationalists subordinated their faith to their respective loyalties

to nationalistic causes during the war. The war was waged on foreign soil and on the domestic front against foreigners and against foreign cultural influences. For the duration of the war, there was no room for cross-national intellectual exchanges or for internationally oriented NGOs except for those considered useful for war purposes.

That sad story, however, proved to be the catalyst for significant developments in the history of intellectual exchange and of international NGOs, for those who witnessed the wartime erosion of internationalist cultural activities and those fortunate enough to have survived the war redoubled their efforts so as never again to repeat the tragedy. The fact that, according to Galtung's figures, the number of international NGOs increased from 135 in 1910 to 375 in 1930 tells the story. The increase took place in the immediate aftermath of the war as intellectuals, artists, and now even government officials were determined to expand internationalist cultural activities and eagerly established new organizations to realize their goal. There is little doubt that the growth of international NGOs and of intellectual exchange took place in an environment where strong reaction against geopolitically defined international affairs was developing. To be sure, geopolitics, exclusionary nationalism, and militarism never disappeared, and they would return with even greater force in the 1930s. But the point is that there was a moment, in the wake of the Great War, when it seemed possible to replace power politics and armaments as determinants of international relations with nonmilitary instrumentalities, including cross-national cultural undertakings.

These undertakings would include, as earlier, international conferences, exchanges of students and scholars, and the like, but now their scope was much wider, and the participants in these programs more diverse, than before the war. Thus, whereas earlier Europeans and North Americans had predominated the scene, after the war individuals and groups from Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America became eager promoters of the movement. To cite but one example, the International Research Council, established in 1919 by associations of scientists, geographers, and others to serve as the headquarters for scientific data and coordinator of conferences, included members from all over the world, even from former enemy nations such as Germany and Austria. International congresses that used to be held almost entirely in Europe or North America were now organized in other parts of the globe;

international congresses of geography, for instance, were convened in Cairo and Buenos Aires.

Nowhere was international intellectual exchange promoted more vigorously or systematically than by the new League of Nations' Intellectual Cooperation Organization, which was established in 1921 in the belief that "no association of nations can hope to exist without the spirit of reciprocal intellectual activity between its members." This was, of course, not a nongovernmental organization but rather an intergovernmental organization. (The growth of intergovernmental organizations was also an important phenomenon of the interwar years, paralleling that of the international NGOs.) But private individuals and groups contributed enormously to the working of the Intellectual Cooperation Organization. In many countries, prominent scholars organized national committees on intellectual cooperation as a liaison between their local cultural institutions and the Geneva organization, often with the support of their respective governments. The fact that by the end of the 1920s more than 40 countries had established national committees on intellectual cooperation suggests that for the first time in modern history nations were giving official recognition to the importance of intellectual and cultural exchange. Still, governmental support, moral or financial, was rather limited, and the initiatives behind the formation and functioning of these committees lay in the hands of private individuals and the organizations they represented.

In all these initiatives, an internationalist ethos, "the international spirit," was manifest. What the term meant was not simply the assertion that the nations of the world must cooperate to preserve the peace through collective-security arrangements; far more important was the proposition that peace and order in the world must be based on cross-national exchanges in such areas as health, education, scholarship, and the arts. These were by definition nonmilitary, nongeopolitical activities, so that the stress on exchange programs was tantamount to a search for an alternative to the traditional international system in which sovereign states and power considerations had been uppermost. International relations, in a sense, were being conceptualized as less great-power oriented and more nonstate driven.

Woodrow Wilson, the preeminent exponent of the postwar international order, was convinced that this must be built upon "world public opinion." Although the term was rather vague, it would not be too

far-fetched to say that the many international NGOs as well as the League and several other intergovernmental organizations that emerged in the aftermath of the war came close to representing world public opinion. Contemporary observers were aware that organization was the key to modern life, both national and international. As Mary Follette, one of the most astute students of political affairs in the United States, wrote as early as 1918, "group organization is to be the new method in politics, the basis of our future industrial system, the foundation of international order" (1918, 345). That was precisely the significance of the new international NGOs and other organizations. This was nowhere more evident in cultural and intellectual exchanges. In the words of Follette, "the old-fashioned hero went out to conquer his enemy; the modern hero goes out to disarm his enemy through creating a mutual understanding," with the result that the world would witness the creation of "a group culture which shall be broader than the culture of one nation alone" (346). Such a vision was behind the countless exchange programs undertaken by so many organizations in the postwar years.

The momentum would never quite dissipate even during the dark decade of the 1930s. It is interesting to note, for instance, that the number of international NGOs actually increased between 1930 and 1940, from 375 to 427, according to Galtung. Why could this have been the case when Germany, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, Spain, and so many other countries were becoming narrowly nationalistic, forsaking internationalism for nationalism? Totalitarian, militaristic states allowed little room for free organizations at home, not to mention free international exchanges. Still, even they at times encouraged the creation of cross-national institutions, "friendship associations" between Germany and Japan, and between Italy and Japan, being examples. Some of the international NGOs founded during the 1930s specifically aimed at mitigating the effects of totalitarianism and war, such as the International Rescue Committee and the Save the Children Foundation. In addition, new student exchange programs were launched, such as the Experiment in International Living (U.S.) and the U.S.-Japan Student Conference, to continue what had begun in the 1920s even in the midst of a world depression and mounting international tensions. Precisely because of these tragic circumstances, thoughtful individuals in many countries, including nondemocratic ones, were determined to promote exchange programs to keep alive the spirit of international understanding. (It is interesting to note that the Ford Foundation in the United

States, the British Council, and Japan's Society for International Cultural Relations were all established in the mid-1930s.) While none of these organizations or activities prevented the coming of war in Asia and Europe, we should note that most of them survived the war and became part of the phenomenon of globalization.

WORLD COMMUNITY DURING THE COLD WAR

If the growth of international NGOs and of intellectual exchange programs was quite notable after the First World War, the story was nothing less than spectacular after the Second World War. There is all too persistent a tendency to view post-1945 world affairs solely in the framework of the cold war. The fact that we tend to call the recent years the "post-cold war" world is an indication of our inability to conceptualize the second half of the 20th century in any other way than through the framework of the cold war. But the cold war, like all wars, is a geopolitical phenomenon; there is nothing particularly unique about it, and to focus on it as the key theme of recent world affairs is to lose sight of the very significant transformation that has taken place in international relations. And one important key to that transformation is the phenomenal growth of internationally oriented NGOs. From a little over 400, their number almost doubled by 1950, tripled by 1960, and reached 2,000 by 1970, a fivefold increase in 30 years—this at the very time when cold war tensions are said to have characterized international affairs. One cannot, of course, ignore the confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers during those decades, but even while they, together with their allies, were busily preparing for (or trying to prevent, through nuclear deterrence) a Third World War, a very significant movement was afoot in all parts of the globe. Part of this was in response to the very gravity of the cold war confrontation; private individuals and organizations, not content to resign themselves to living in fear of nuclear war, launched their own, often modest, endeavors to restrain the arms race and to keep open the channels of communication across the great divide that separated one side in the cold war from the other.

But the fear of war was only one factor behind the expansion of international NGOs. Many cross-national organizations were created to concern themselves with such matters as refugee relief and settlement, alternative energy development, economic and technical assistance, human rights, and the protection of the natural environment. Most of

these issues were new; at least they became objects of cross-national concern on a massive scale only after the Second World War. The sheer facts, for instance, that over 30 million Europeans became "displaced persons" or that 25 million Russians were homeless in the wake of the war required massive relief work by international agencies. The development of nuclear energy attracted the attention of scientists all over the world who saw it as a solution to the vexing problems of poverty in most parts of the globe. Likewise, the decolonization of so many former colonies and "nation-building" endeavors by the newly independent nations called for technical assistance, capital investment, and educational reforms for which international NGOs would provide private funds and services where governments could not. But economic development, as well as rapid economic growth on the part of advanced countries, created environmental problems which, perhaps more than anything else after the war, mandated international solution. In the meantime, the experiences of the 1930s and the war seemed to reveal that abuses of children, women, minorities, prisoners, and other marginalized groups in various countries should never be seen as merely domestic phenomena but should be viewed as objects of shared concern by the whole world. Here again, international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, would play key roles in identifying and trying to mitigate these abuses.

It should be noted that most of these issues and the efforts to cope with them existed in the early postwar years; that is why so many intergovernmental organizations and international NGOs were created during the quarter century after the Second World War. CARE (Co-operative for American Remittances to Europe) was established in 1946, the Church World Service also opened in 1946, private voluntary organizations replaced the U.S. government as funders for UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) in 1947, Direct Relief International's establishment followed in 1948, in 1949 the United Nations sponsored a conference of scientific experts on utilization of resources, and in 1950 the International Confederation of Catholic Charities was created. The eruption of the Korean War and, throughout the 1950s, of other international crises did not halt the momentum. In addition to agencies primarily concerned with relief work, such as the International Voluntary Service and the Medical Assistance Program International, organized in 1953 and 1954, respectively, new ones came into being that were concerned with energy and

environmental questions. Various organizations represented at the first Geneva conference on atomic energy held in 1955 were an example of the former, and Human Earth, established in Switzerland in 1960, is an example of the latter.

These initiatives would be followed in the 1960s and the 1970s by international NGOs with a mission to assist development and eradicate poverty in Third World countries, as well as, increasingly, to protect the rights of women, children, and dissidents there and elsewhere. Among the most famous of such organizations were the Pan-American Development Foundation (1962), the Protestant Association for Cooperation in Development (1962), Terre des Hommes France (1963), the International Association for Rural Development (1964), the Interchurch Coordinating Committee for Development Projects (1964), Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement (1965), the Pan-African Institute for Development (1965), the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (1965), and Les Hommes pour les Hommes (1968). The list can be extended almost indefinitely, especially after around 1972 when the number of international NGOs began to grow even more phenomenally than earlier. Suffice it to note that during the quarter century after 1945, the geopolitics of the cold war described only one layer of world affairs, and that underneath the surface drama grave problems of demography, migration, decolonization, democratization, and environmental protection constituted additional layers, impelling private individuals and groups in many lands to organize themselves, since their states appeared less willing to commit their attention to these matters than to national security or armament. (It should also be recognized that there was, from time to time, cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in some of these areas, most notably in alternative energy development.)

The spirit of these nongovernmental organizations went back to Wilsonian internationalism. At a meeting of the United Nations' Human Rights Commission in 1951, for instance, a spokesman for the World Jewish Congress, one of the prominent international NGOs, stated, "nongovernmental organizations represent elements and aspirations in international public opinion which must play a significant role in the development and consolidation of a genuine world community." Every part of this sentence echoed the internationalist spirit of the 1920s, but the spirit now confronted an even graver challenge because of the rise of the new issues claiming world attention. It is not too much

to say that thanks to the strength of such conviction and to the growth of international NGOs that embodied it, the world community survived the cold war; indeed, the very concept of world community would have been incompatible with the cold war confrontation, and it is to the great credit of the international NGOs as well as of the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations that the concept survived the nuclear fear. In 1940, on the eve of the German spring offensive, Leonard Woolf had written, "If, when this war is over, we continue to live under the threat of yet another war . . . the black-out of civilised life will be permanent" (1944, 36-37). The cold war did continue to force people to "live under the threat of yet another war," but we can also say that in most parts of the globe a "black-out" of civilization did not occur. Woolf's prophesy proved inaccurate to that degree because he underestimated the growing strength of nongovernmental organizations. (Ironically, he had been one writer who had stressed the importance of such organizations in the world after the First World War.)

Because the post-1945 international NGOs were concerned with so many issues, they were no longer synonymous with cultural and intellectual exchanges as earlier. Humanitarian, economic, and politically oriented NGOs were often far more conspicuous than more traditional exchange programs across nations. There was even a tendency for intellectual exchange programs to become politicized when intellectuals from many countries cooperated, not primarily in exchanging information or coordinating their research activities, but in pursuing political objectives or ideological agendas. Perhaps this was inescapable, given their widely shared alarm over the possibility of a nuclear war or their eagerness to promote dialogue across the Iron Curtain. Such examples as the Pugwash Conferences, where scientists from many countries came together and called for nuclear arms control, and the Committee of Scholarly Exchange with the People's Republic of China, organized in Washington long before the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, come to mind. Moreover, the participation of more and more intellectuals from outside Europe and North America in exchange activities inevitably gave rise to some serious questioning about the alleged universalism of certain values and principles. Cultural and intellectual exchange, many of them came to assert, had too often meant the transmission of Western ideas and standards to the non-West. It was time, they argued, that there developed a more equal exchange. Instead of universalism, they would stress cultural diversity.

There was a danger that such a clash between different perspectives could stifle cross-national exchange programs, as happened most graphically when the United States and Great Britain withdrew from UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization), the major international organization dedicated to intellectual exchange, accusing it of having succumbed to parochial agendas of Third World countries.

Nevertheless, intellectual exchange programs, now as part of the wider phenomenon of various types of cross-national, nonstate activities, did their part in promoting an alternative to the cold war. Students, scholars, artists, and many others crossed national borders and developed what would later come to be called cultural "borderlands"—shared spaces that belonged to no particular country but where individuals and groups from a number of nations exchanged, shared, and molded their own ideas and agendas. Besides, although often heated argument took place between universalists and particularists, between the exponents of universal values and of cultural diversity, a number of nongovernmental organizations (such as the Hazen Foundation of New Haven) quietly undertook the task to search for a framework of intellectual cooperation encompassing a variety of cultural perspectives. Despite the often harsh rhetoric of Third Worldism, Orientalism, and the like, in reality there was a great deal of engagement among intellectuals of all countries. Even a phenomenon like the "counter-cultural" movements of the 1960s in many parts of the world may be understood in the same context of global cultural exchange. This was a significant phenomenon in that nonstate actors were asserting a role to determine individual and social destinies. They were preserving and strengthening the vision of a world community at a time when adherents to the cold war definition of international affairs were dividing the globe.

INTERNATIONAL NGOS AND GLOBALIZATION

In some such fashion, international NGOs in general and intellectual exchange programs in particular may be said to have contributed to the globalization of human affairs. Clearly, globalization did not arise all of a sudden in the wake of the cold war; it had emerged long before there was a cold war, but it also developed as a reaction against the cold war. By the 1980s, the number of international NGOs had increased to over 10,000, with some 80,000 national branches. They, combined with

intergovernmental organizations (now numbering over 1,500) and multinational business enterprises, were overshadowing the states whose traditional roles as providers of security and welfare for their citizens were also in need of redefinition in view of such globalizing tendencies.

The phenomenon is the most significant aspect of the so-called post-cold war world order. As noted already, the end of the cold war is not a particularly notable landmark in the long history of international NGOs, but to the extent that a geopolitically defined international system collapsed in 1989, it is easy to see that the international NGOs have become all the more important. Of course, geopolitics has not gone away, nor have armaments, war plans, and such. But that does not mean that we have to continue to conceptualize international affairs solely or primarily in the geopolitical framework. The widespread preoccupation with the emergence of China as the next superpower suggests an inability to go beyond the geopolitical mode of thinking. Whatever the merits of the geopolitical imagination, it is totally inadequate as a guide to understanding the contemporary world, a world in which 200 or so states are competing with 20,000 or 30,000 international nongovernmental organizations for people's loyalty, and in which nongeopolitical issues such as human rights and environmental protection are daily gaining importance. International NGOs as gathering places of those who have tended to be excluded from positions of influence in a geopolitically defined world—women, minorities, the disabled, the disenfranchised—are also likely to continue to grow.

That various international NGOs, together with intergovernmental organizations, have already made a difference may be seen in such recent examples as the successful negotiation for a treaty to ban the use of antipersonnel land mines, the Kyoto agreement on limiting carbon dioxide emissions, or the prospective drafting of an international convention on crimes against humanity. Changes in the international system, generations of theorists have insisted, are possible only through force or the threat of use of force. Ian Clark, for instance, notes in a widely used textbook, "the major deficiency of the international system is its inability to devise any universally acceptable means for promoting peaceful change" (1989, 28). Such truisms can no longer be taken for granted in a world in which a large number of voluntary organizations are working together to bring about peaceful change.

The numerical growth of international NGOs has, it is true, created some serious problems. One concerns the issue of accountability. To whom are the international NGOs accountable when their officers are not usually elected by their members and come from several countries? Is there any guarantee that they will not disregard laws and interests of sovereign nations? A founder of Médecins sans Frontières has even asserted that all international NGOs are by definition subversive of state authority, that in serving the interests of the whole of humanity, these organizations cannot be constrained by any government. But who determines what constitutes the interests of humanity? One way of coping with such criticism would be to say that the international NGOs are accountable to "international public opinion," but unlike domestic public opinion, world public opinion is not institutionalized and is impossible to measure. Moreover, if some international NGO mismanages its affairs, what sanctions can be applied, and by whom? A super-international NGO, an umbrella organization, may then become necessary to maintain some order among the proliferating organizations, but the question of accountability will remain. The matter becomes complicated because, although international NGOs have been spreading all over the world, funds, leadership personnel, and initiatives for issue-oriented movements are still predominantly concentrated in Western Europe and North America. Can it be said that what Europeans and Americans undertake reflects the wishes of people elsewhere?

These are serious questions that will grow even more so as the number of international NGOs continues to increase. But they cannot be satisfactorily discussed except cross-nationally; to deal with them within the framework of sovereign states will be unrealistic for the very reason that the international NGOs have mushroomed precisely because the states have failed to cope with many of the world's acute problems. At the same time, it will be naive to expect that an easy solution will be found to the question of the governance of international NGOs. As a modest beginning, may we not say that this is where intellectual exchange becomes of such critical importance? Intellectuals from various countries would seem to have a duty to try to understand and respond to the urgent problems that have resulted from the very successes of the international NGOs. It is often said that what the world needs is "confidence-building." Mutual understanding and confidence must be built not simply among nations and among international NGOs

but also between the states, on one hand, and the international NGOs, on the other. For this reason alone, the significance of intellectual exchange will remain.

There is, however, another way in which we can understand today's international NGOs in general and intellectual exchange programs in particular. It may very well be that they can serve to provide links to traditional values such as justice, freedom, and compassion, which are said to be eroding in the rapidly changing technological environment of today's world. If globalization is pushing for a more interdependent world in terms of commerce, investment, migration, and especially transportation and communication, it has also undermined the sense of community among people who feel themselves to be adrift in a sea of technology that they cannot control. They may vaguely feel they are part of an interdependent world community, but that community has not yet defined its own moral or spiritual basis. The stress on individual acquisitiveness in a materialistic world tends to erode any sense of community. Perhaps to overcome this tendency, religious, ethnic, and other groups have asserted their role as definers of a new loyalty, as foundations for a new culture. The result has been that globalization has produced its antitheses: localism, ethnocentrism, and cultural chauvinism.

In such a situation, may we not say that cross-national associations of individuals such as international NGOs serve to preserve a sense of community and provide a moral basis for human interactions? David Hollinger (1995), one of the most perceptive observers of the contemporary American scene, has noted that there has emerged a tension between "cosmopolitanism" and "pluralism" in the United States and (by extension) elsewhere, the former favoring voluntary associations and the latter stressing segmented identities. By definition, NGOs belong in the former category, but they may also serve to provide a sense of identity. The American philosopher Richard Rorty has argued that in today's changing world, "private clubs" of like-minded individuals may be the only institutions giving people their identity and sense of community. NGOs are like private clubs, bringing together individuals who share similar concerns and values. But these individuals need not be members of the same national, ethnic, or religious community. There can be cross-national private clubs that provide a sense of identity, loyalty, and purpose to individuals who otherwise feel lost in an uncertain world.

Intellectual exchanges from the beginning involved the creation and development of "private clubs," consisting of educated men and women who shared similar interests and goals. They have developed their own networks which, combined with countless other networks built by international NGOs, are now enveloping the world. They have not replaced, nor will they replace, other institutions (including states) in the governance of people. But to the extent that globalization requires some semblance of order and a measure of accountability, here is a critical role to be played by those international NGOs that are engaged in intellectual exchange programs. Their challenge in the next century will be to try to be more successful than states, churches, or business enterprises have thus far been in providing the world community with sensible balance between globalization and diversity, between modern technology and traditional values, and between freedom and order.

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